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Non-technical summary 
 
Investment in continuing vocational training constitutes a major part of post school human 
capital increment. Obviously, heterogeneity of employees plays a role not only in obtaining 
skills, but also in economic consequences of education and training. 
 
Empirical work on the wage impact of training has noted that unobserved heterogeneity of 
training participants should play a role. The expected return to training, which partly depends 
on unobservable characteristics, is likely to be a crucial criterion in the decision to take part in 
training or not. Therefore, the decision to take part in continuous training is likely to be 
influenced by the expected returns to training; i.e. those workers for whom the expected 
return is higher will obtain more training than other workers for whom the expected return is 
lower. Hence, participants and nonparticipants in training are unlikely to have the same 
observed and hypothetical returns. Severe econometric problems are therefore posed by the 
endogeneity of training decisions. 
 
While former empirical work with German data has extensively analyzed the wage effect of 
training, none of them has accounted for the likely possibility that worker selection into 
training is based on the expected heterogeneous return to continuous training. We try to 
account for this by using recent advances in estimating returns to schooling, which allow for 
selection on unobservables, and apply it to estimating the impact of training on earnings. 
Allowing heterogeneity to be unobserved by the econometrician, but assuming that 
individuals may act upon this heterogeneity, completely changes the interpretation and 
properties of commonly used estimators. 
 
We use German survey data from 1998/1999 and the Local IV method, which allows for 
observed as well as unobserved heterogeneity and that selection into training may depend on 
both. Our LIV estimate is much lower than the relevant OLS and IV estimate (and 
furthermore, insignificant). We cannot find any causal effect of training on wages when 
taking into account that more able and motivated individuals participate in training, or those 
which are on a promotion path where training courses are part of the way. 
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Abstract
Empirical work on the wage impact of training has noted that unobserved
heterogeneity of training participants should play a role. The expected re-
turn to training, which partly depends on unobservable characteristics, is
likely to be a crucial criterion in the decision to take part in training or
not. We try to account for this fact by using recent advances in estimating
returns to schooling, which allow for selection on unobservables, and apply
it to estimating the impact of training on earnings. Allowing heterogene-
ity to be unobserved by the econometrician, but assuming that individuals
may act upon this heterogeneity, completely changes the interpretation and
properties of commonly used estimators. Our results based on local instru-
mental variables suggest that traditional estimates of the wage impact of
training overestimate this effect.
Keywords: Vocational training, treatment effects, semiparametric estima-
tion, Local instrumental variables
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1 Introduction
Investment in continuing vocational training constitutes a major part of post
school human capital increment. A survey conducted by the IW Cologne
(Institut der deutschen Wirtschaft Ko¨ln) in cooperation with the chambers
of commerce and crafts shows that German companies consider training im-
portant to enhance their competitiveness. In 2001, firms invested nearly
17 billion Euro in continuing vocational training (Weiß, 2003). Almost all
companies offer training and about half of the employees participated in
seminars, courses or on-the job training. Since 1998, when the last IW-
survey on continuing vocational training was conducted, companies have
cut the duration of training spells and expenditure per employee to improve
the efficiency of training. Since the total number of training participants in-
creased at the same time, total investment in continuing vocational training
remained at the same spending level as in 1998 (Weiß, 2000).
Participation depends on workplace and employee characteristics. In Ger-
many, around 80 percent of high qualified workers take part in training at
least once in 1997-1999, but less than 30 percent of those workers which
are less qualified participate (Kuckulenz and Zwick, 2003). Employees in
small firms participate less in training than those in large firms and also
women, foreigners, and workers above forty years of age receive less training
(Pischke, 2001).
Obviously, heterogeneity of employees plays a role not only in obtaining
skills, but also in economic consequences of education and training. As noted
by the OECD (2004), only little is known about how the training impact on
wages varies across heterogeneous training participants. The small empirical
literature with German data has shown that training type as well as worker,
job, and firm characteristics determine the wage impact of training. Re-
cently, Pannenberg (1998), Ju¨rges and Schneider (2005) and Kuckulenz and
Zwick (2003) have compared the wage effects of subgroups of employees with
German data. Other work concentrates on certain aspects of heterogeneity,
e.g. differences in training returns between employees with different edu-
cational backgrounds (Lynch, 1992; Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1996;
OECD, 1999; OECD, 2004), age (OECD, 2004), men and women (Pischke,
2001) or tenure (Pannenberg, 1998). Some of these papers come up with
rather high estimates for the impact of training on wages which could be ex-
plained by unobserved factors: e.g. whether an employee is on a promotion
path, climbing a steep ladder upwards or how able and motivated someone
is. Pfeiffer and Reize (2001) interpret their results to show that training and
career paths are intertwined and that higher wages may not actually be the
consequence of training, but result from excellent career management. Like-
wise, Pischke (2001) finds that selection in training seems not to be based
on wage levels but rather on earnings growth. For an overview of recent
international estimates of wage returns to continuing vocational training,
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compare Leuven (2005).
Recent literature on the returns to schooling provides methods which allow
that returns may vary across schooling types and participants. Carneiro,
Heckman and Vytlacil (2003) apply methods which allow for the likely fact
that the expected return of the investment in human capital plays a role
when deciding about the investment. Among others, also Blundell, Dearden
and Sianesi (2005) have noted the importance of allowing for (observable)
heterogeneity in returns to education. Selection into training may depend
much more on individuals’ ability and motivation than does selection into
schooling, where family background characteristics are the main determi-
nants (Ammermu¨ller, 2004; Lauer, 2002). Also, training costs and maybe
even training returns are more obvious and hence may play a more crucial
role for the decision to take part in training than for the schooling decision.
Our study uses recent econometric methods, which allow for selection on
unobservables, and apply it to estimating the impact of training on earnings.
With German survey data from 1998/1999, we explore the heterogeneity
of training returns and how this may affect participation in training. By
using the Local Instrumental Variables (LIV) method, we account for the
heterogeneity of training returns in our analysis and allow for observed as
well as unobserved heterogeneity. Therefore, the assumptions are much less
stringent than those of ordinary least squares or conventional IV regressions.
In fact, if unobserved heterogeneity is relevant and individuals act upon it,
OLS and linear IV estimates can be seriously misleading (see Heckman and
Vytlacil, 2005).
The following section provides a brief discussion of the theoretical back-
ground and previous empirical work. In the following, first the econometric
method used is introduced, second the data set is described, and third the
implementation and the estimation results are presented. The last section
concludes and gives an outlook.
2 Background Discussion
It has been noted in the literature that bargaining and rent-sharing between
employer and employee should have an impact on the share of the rent gener-
ated by training which is granted to the training participant (e.g. Dearden,
Reed and Van Reenen, 2000 and Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan, 2004).
Therefore, heterogeneity in training returns cannot only be explained by
differences in productivity effects of training, but also by differences in indi-
vidual, firm, and job characteristics which relate to the bargaining power of
employer and employee. Lazear (1979) notes that wages and productivity
at a given point in the career do not have to correspond. Employees may
first receive wages that are lower than their productivity and at a later stage
of their professional career, they can profit from early investments in their
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human capital. In contrast, training demand should be highest for firm en-
trants and also the productivity effect of training should then be highest for
this group. The return to training for workers with low qualifications should
be higher if individuals with low qualifications are constrained in their choice
of education. On the other hand, it may be that employer provided training
is complementary to education (Blundell, Dearden and Meghir, 1999) and
therefore favors higher skilled employees.
Kuckulenz and Zwick (2003) find with German data that the effect of train-
ing on earnings differs between agents with a broad spectrum of different
characteristics and between firms with different characteristics. High-skilled
employees profit more from training than low-skilled workers, the training
earnings mark-up increases with professional experience but decreases with
company tenure. Employees with previous unemployment spells and em-
ployees with temporary contracts profit less from training. Smaller firms,
firms in a good economic situation, and firms that share profits with their
employees pay a higher training earnings mark-up. The authors interpret
these findings as evidence that the training wage effect not only depends on
the productivity increase induced by training, but also on the bargaining
position between employer and employee. Hence, the increase in produc-
tivity caused by training must not directly correspond to the wage effect of
training. Nevertheless, the wage impact of training is frequently taken as
(the lower bound of) the productivity impact of training (Blundell, Dearden
and Meghir, 1999).
The decision to take part in continuous training is likely to be influenced by
the expected returns to training; i.e. those workers for whom the expected
return is higher will obtain more training than other workers for whom the
expected return is lower. Hence, participants and nonparticipants in training
are unlikely to have the same observed and hypothetical returns. Severe
econometric problems are therefore posed by the endogeneity of training
decisions. While former empirical work with German data has extensively
analyzed the wage effect of training, none of them has accounted for the
likely possibility that worker selection into training is based on the expected
heterogeneous return to continuous training.
Previous work has solved the endogeneity problem by using a Heckman-
type selection correction term from a training participation equation (e.g.
Lynch, 1992). Also Blundell, Dearden and Meghir (1996) argue that con-
tinuous training might be correlated with transitory shocks to productivity
and therefore include a Heckman correction term into their wage growth
equation. Other authors tried to tackle the endogeneity problem by using in-
strumental variable estimation (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2001 or Kuckulenz
and Zwick, 2003) or nonparametric matching methods (Gerfin, 2004). Also,
fixed effects estimators have been used (Booth and Bryan, 2005; Pischke,
2001 or Barron, Berger and Black, 1999), which produce unbiased estimates
whenever unobserved individual effects are permanent. Leuven and Ooster-
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beek (2002) use a different approach to estimate the causal effect of training
on wages by using information about workers who planned to participate
in training but did not due to some exogenous event. They use this group
of workers as the comparison group and assume that within their sample,
participation in training is random.
The estimated least-squares coefficient of the individual’s choice parameter
is only then to be interpreted as the causal effect of training on wages if
workers are randomly assigned to take part in training. We have argued
above that employees are either chosen by the employer providing training
or that they select themselves into training and this implies that standard
estimations using least squares produce biased results. Therefore, we rely
on recent advances in estimating the returns to schooling using evaluation
methods. In the literature, which was mainly spurred by Heckman and co-
authors, schooling is treated as an endogenous variable in the standard wage
function.
While former work on training in Germany relied on the unconfoundedness
or selection on observables assumption, we want to explicitly allow for het-
erogeneity of wage effects of training and for selection on unoberservables.
With detailed information about the qualification profile and professional
history of workers, the organizational and technological condition of work-
places, as well as some employer characteristics, we are able to explain a large
part of the variation in wages. Nevertheless, some characteristics which are
crucial for the selection into training are missing; above all ability, moti-
vation and the information whether individuals are on a promotion path.
Former work has also shown that workers with higher wage growth parti-
cipate more often in training (Pischke, 2001). With our cross section data,
we cannot account for this directly since we observe wages only once.
The advantage of the econometric model we are using is that it allows the
effect of training to vary both in terms of observed and unobserved fac-
tors. Firms may offer training to those workers who are expected to be
more productive after training or those workers who expect wage gains from
training participation may select themselves into training courses. Since
the probability of treatment increases with the gains from treatment, we
allow the impact of training on earnings to differ across individuals and for
selection on gains. Hence, we assume that individuals are forward looking
agents who have expectations on the impact of training participation on
their wage. Adequate instrumental variables have to be found that explain
the selection into training participation in order to correct for treatment
selection. We should stress again that under the heterogeneity assumptions
stated above, conventional IV methods will not yield unbiased results. To
get reliable results, much stronger assumptions on effect heterogeneity or
individual choice behavior have to be imposed, which might be implausible
in our case. Therefore, if no stronger assumptions can be made, evaluation
methods like the local IV model are necessary to estimate the impact of
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training on earnings.
3 Econometric Model
The causal effects of training on earnings are analyzed within the frame-
work of econometric evaluation methods. These methods take into account
heterogeneous effects of training for each individual, which may depend on
observable or unobservable factors. Allowing heterogeneity to be unobserved
by the econometrician, but assuming that individuals act upon this unob-
served heterogeneity completely changes the interpretation and properties of
common estimators taking (observed) heterogeneity into account. Carneiro,
Heckman and Vytlacil (2003) and Heckman and Vytlacil (2005) show that
conventional IV estimators substantially misestimate the average marginal
return and policy relevant effects.
Two main streams of non-experimental methods taking unobserved hetero-
geneity into account can be divided. First, there are methods which control
for the correlation between individual factors and program participation by
using an adequate instrument. The second approach is to measure all indi-
vidual factors that may be the cause of the correlation between individual
factors and program participation and then, for example, match on these
observed variables (Blundell, Dearden and Sianesi, 2005). For a review of
different approaches see Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1999) or Caliendo
and Hujer (2005). Imbens (2004) describes methods for selection on observ-
ables, Angrist (2004) focuses on models where selection is influenced by un-
observable heterogeneity. While selection models try to model the complete
selection process, the IV method, which is used here, focuses on searching
a source of independent variation affecting the decision to participate but
not the outcome (in our case, earnings). Other estimation strategies are
based on difference in difference estimation which erase only time-invariant
selection.
In the following, a formal description of the basic framework of evaluation
econometrics is given. Let D indicate the choice of treatment, that is
D =
{
1 if the individual receives treatment,
0 otherwise.
Concerning the outcome variable, it is assumed that latent values exist for
every possible value of the treatment variable. These latent outcome vari-
ables are denoted by Y1 and Y0 for D = 1 and D = 0, respectively. Only one
of the two latent outcomes can be observed, as every individual can solely
choose one treatment status. Therefore, the observed outcome is given by
Y = DY1 + (1−D)Y0. In the binary treatment case at hand, it means that
every individual would receive an income in the treated as well as in the
untreated case. Y1 is observed for participants and Y0 for nonparticipants.
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The causal effect of treatment D on the outcome variable Y is defined to be
∆ = Y1 − Y0. (1)
This difference is unobservable for every individual, as either Y1 or Y0 can-
not be observed. Different methods have been developed in the literature
to overcome this problem. In general, averages of (1) for various subgroups
are considered. The average treatment effect ∆ATE is the effect on an av-
erage individual of the population, whereas the average treatment effect on
the treated ∆TT and the average treatment effect on the untreated ∆TUT
state the effects for the subpopulations of treated and untreated individuals,
respectively. Formally, the effects are defined by
∆ATE := E[Y1 − Y0] (2)
∆TT := E[Y1 − Y0|D = 1] (3)
∆TUT := E[Y1 − Y0|D = 0] (4)
All effects can be defined conditional onX, for example ∆ATE(x) = E[∆|X =
x].
In the empirical analysis of this paper, we use the Local Instrumental Vari-
able (LIV) method of Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2001, 2005) . First,
the framework and underlying assumptions are described. Then we line out
another causal effect, the marginal treatment effect, which was defined by
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999) and relationships with the various types of
causal effects are shown. Finally, the estimation strategy is outlined.
The treatment indicator D is modelled by a latent index model:
D = 1(µD(Z)− UD ≥ 0). (5)
1(A) is the indicator function, that is 1(A) = 1 if A is true and 1(A) = 0
otherwise. µD(Z) is a function of some instrumental variables Z. The latent
outcomes are functions of some observable variables X and unobservable
factors U0 and U1, i.e. Yi = g(X,Ui), for i = 1, 2. Participation in training
corresponds to D = 1, nonparticipants are identified by D = 0.
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2001, 2005) state the following assump-
tions:
• GivenX, µD(Z) depends in a nontrivial way on Z. This corresponds to
the usual assumption of instrument relevance in linear IV models, i.e.,
the instruments have to influence the training decicion after controlling
for other covariates X.
• UD is independent from X and all error terms in the model are inde-
pendent from Z given X. This is the usual exclusion restriction of IV
models which states that Z has no influence on the dependent variable
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after the covariates X are accounted for. A detailed discussion of these
assumptions in the context of evaluation models is given by Vytlacil
(2002).
• The error term UD of the latent index model (5) is assumed to be
absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure.
• Furthermore, E|Y1| and E|Y0| are assumed to be finite, which guaran-
tees the existence of E[Y ].
• For every individual, the probablility of participation P (D = 1) lies
strictly beetween zero and one, given the observable characteristics X.
With this setup, Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2001, 2005) define the
marginal treatment effect, which is the causal effect of D given X and UD:
∆MTE(x, u) = E[Y1 − Y0|X = x,UD = u] (6)
The marginal treatment effect provides a framework to obtain expressions
for various average treatment effects. Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000,
2001) derive the following relationships:
∆ATE(x) =
∫ 1
0
∆MTE(x, u)du (7)
∆TT(x) =
∫ 1
0
∆MTE(x, u)
1− FP (Z)|X(u|x)
E[P (Z)|X] du (8)
∆TUT(x) =
∫ 1
0
∆MTE(x, u)
FP (Z)|X(u|x)
E[1− P (Z)|X]du. (9)
Here, P (Z) is shorthand for P (D = 1|Z). Therefore, integration of the
suitable weighted marginal treatment effects over the [0, 1]-interval yields
estimates of treatment effects for different subpopulations. The basic ingre-
dient of this procedure is the marginal treatment effect. To get an estimate
of it, the Local Instrumental Variables (LIV) estimator was proposed by
Heckman and Vytlacil (1999, 2000, 2001, 2005):
∆̂MTE(x, P (z)) =
∂E[Y |X = x, P (Z) = P (z)]
∂P (z)
(10)
The LIV method estimates the marginal treatment effect for u = P (z). This
can be seen by forming the derivative of the expectation of Y given P (Z)
and noting that Y = DY1 + (1−D)Y0.
The definition of the local average treatment effect ∆LATE of Imbens and
Angrist (1994) can be used to motivate the marginal treatment effect. The
LATE is defined by
∆LATE(x, P (z), P (z′)) =
E[Y |P (Z) = P (z), X = x]− E[Y |P (Z) = P (z′), X = x]
P (D = 1|Z = z)− P (D = 1|Z = z′) . (11)
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This is the treatment effect for the subgroup of individuals who change their
treatment status due to a change of the instrument Z from z to z′. This
subgroup of so-called compliers cannot be identified in a given dataset. For
comments and criticism of this concept see Heckman (1997) and Angrist,
Imbens and Rubin (1996) and the accompanying discussions. Considering
P (z) → P (z′), the expression of the LATE tends to the derivative of the
conditional expectation of Y :
lim
P (z)→P (z′)
∆LATE(x, P (z), P (z′)) =
∂E[Y |X = x, P (Z) = P (z)]
∂P (z)
. (12)
The LIV-estimator estimates some sort of marginal LATE. Therefore, the
marginal treatment effect can be interpreted as the effect on an individual
with observable characteristics X and unobservables UD which is indifferent
about participation.
4 Data
For our analysis, we use a rich and representative German data set with
information on 0.1 percent of all individuals employed in 1998/1999 - the
BIBB/IAB data set “Qualification and Career Survey”. The cross-section
data allow an assessment of the impact of training measures in 1996-98
on wages in 1998/1999. Our sample contains more than 7,400 male (full-
time) employees from West Germany. We include about 70 explanatory
variables that capture the salient employer and employee characteristics for
wage determination (see also table 2 in the appendix for the complete list
with detailed descriptions).
The outcome variable is log midpoints of earnings in 1998/1999 from 18
earnings categories in the data. This variable has the advantage that earn-
ings of highly paid workers are not censored from above.
The key explanatory variable is participation in training courses and sem-
inars that serve professional development during the years 1996 to 1998.
This dummy might stand for quite substantial amounts of training, because
employees might participate in various courses during 24 months. In ad-
dition, only formal training courses are included in the data set and short
or informal training spells are explicitly excluded. Note that apprenticeship
training is also excluded. Unfortunately, we don’t have information about
the content and the length of courses and we do not know the costs of train-
ing or who bears them. 58 percent of the employees participated in further
training according to this definition (table 2 in the appendix). Participation
differs tremendously for low and high skilled employees: while only around
30 percent of the workers without professional degree participated in train-
ing, 50 percent of the employees with a vocational school degree or an ap-
prenticeship training took part in some kind of training during the last two
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years, and about 80 percent of high skilled employees ( master craftsman,
university of applied sciences, and university degree) participated. Training
participation also varies with age: 30 - 45 year old employees receive most
training, older worker participate less (see figures 1 and 2 in the appendix).
In our estimations, we use three different instrumental variables. The first
instrument we use is the training intensity by industry, estimated from an
earlier wave (1991/1992) of the BIBB/IAB-survey. Theoretically, it is not
plausible that training intensity per sector in 1991/1992 influences individ-
ual wages in 1998/1999. In contrasts, it is very likely that individuals which
are employed in a sector with a high training intensity in 1991/1992 have a
higher chance to participate in training in 1998/1999 than individuals in an
economic sector with a low training intensity in 1991/1992. Empirically, the
training intensity per economic sector in 1991/1992 is not correlated with
earnings seven years later but influences the individual probability to take
part in training. Also, we imputed data from the Continuing Vocational
Training Survey (CVTS 2000) about sectoral shares of firms and shares of
firms by employment size that include continuous training in their collec-
tive bargaining agreement.1 There is no obvious link of this variable with
individual earnings, using additionally sector dummies as covariates, but it
influences the individual probability to take part in training. As third in-
strumental variable, we use a dummy variable indicating whether workers
are employed in a modern job (in contrast to a traditional job) because the
demand for training is higher in these jobs. After controlling for economic
sector and occupation, we consider it as an valid instrument (compare results
of the propensity score, table 3).
Further determinants of earnings are those found in the Mincer equation, i.e.
actual work experience,2 job tenure, former unemployment, and dummies
for the highest educational achievement.3 These variables are related to
the situation in 1998/1999. Together with these standard variables, we also
include 11 dummies capturing the professional status, such as blue-collar or
white-collar worker, civil servant or different sophistication levels of tasks
for 1998/1999.
In addition, we use the following current job characteristics: computer use,
profit-sharing, bonus payments, overtime work, whether a job is temporary,
and 13 dummies for main job contents. These variables allow us to control a
part of the individual heterogeneity between the employees. 4 Some of these
1The CVTS data is from 1999 and therefore fits well to the BIBB/IAB data set.
2We know when the individual started his or her first job and we include dummies for
discontinuation such as unemployment.
3In Germany, the highest schooling degree is more informative for the level of education
than years of schooling (Georegellis and Lange, 1997).
4Some of these variables may also be endogenous in the earnings equation. We do not
control for this, because those variables mainly serve as control variables for employee
heterogeneity.
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variables (for example working overtime) can be interpreted as indicators of
intrinsic motivation. Additional control variables explaining earnings are
personal attributes. We include a dummy for children and non-German
nationality.
Finally, we add some employer characteristics: seven dummies for firm size,
5 dummies indicating the economic sector of the employer, 11 dummies for
the federal state the firm is located in, and a dummy indicating whether the
firm is in a good economic situation in 1998/1999.
Only full-time5 employees (without self-employed) in West Germany are in-
cluded, because in 1998 there were still large differences in the labor market
structures of the two parts of the country. The analysis is restricted to
male employees, because the data do not allow us to model participation in
the labor market simultaneously, which would be important for examining
earnings effects for women.6 This reduces the sample to around 7,500 indi-
viduals. The descriptive characteristics of the variables used can be found
in table 2 in the appendix.
In order to obtain clean evidence on the earnings effects of employer-provided
training, we exclude those training participants where we cannot be sure
whether they were employed or unemployed while being trained (about 450
cases). The reason for this restriction is that we want to exclude training
provided by government aimed at unemployed. Wage effects of training
should differ for those employees which stay with a firm and those which
move (Booth and Bryan, 2005; Gerfin, 2004; Loewenstein and Spletzer, 1998;
Lynch, 1992; OECD, 2004; Garloff and Kuckulenz, 2006). In our data set
we can only identify very few individuals which change their employer after
attending continuing training. We cannot show any significant difference
between job stayers and movers and hence, we restrict our sample to those
which stay with their employer.
5 Implementation and Results
The basic building blocks of the empirical analysis are estimates of ∆MTE(x, u).
For this purpose, estimates of the derivative of the conditional expectation of
Y given X and P (Z) are needed. The latent outcome equations are specified
5We include only employees working 30 hours and above per week. Only 2.6 percent of
the male employees work less than 30 hours. We also use a dummy for working overtime in
order to take hours worked into account. The results do not change qualitatively, however,
if we use log hourly wages instead of log earnings as the dependent variable.
6In order to include women, we would need to correct for sample selection in the
earnings equation. This is impossible since only those women who participate in the labor
market are included in the data.
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as:
lnY1 = α1 +Xθ1 + U1 (13)
lnY0 = α0 +Xθ0 + U0 (14)
The observable outcome is therefore given by
lnY = D lnY1 + (1−D) lnY0
= α0 +Xθ0 +D(α1 − α0) +DX(θ1 − θ0)
+DU1 + (1−D)U0. (15)
From this, the conditional expectation of lnY given X and P (Z) follows as
E[lnY |X,P (Z)] = α0 +Xθ0 + P (Z)(α1 − α0) + P (Z)X(θ1 − θ0) +
P (Z)E[U1|P (Z)] + (1− P (Z))E[U0|P (Z)] (16)
The derivative of (16) with respect to P (Z) is given by
∂E[lnY |X,P (Z)]
∂P (Z)
= (α1 − α0) +X(θ1 − θ0) +K(P (Z)) (17)
whereK(P (Z)) = ∂(P (Z)E[U1|P (Z)]+(1−P (Z))E[U0|P (Z)])∂P (Z) . To estimate ∆
MTE(x, u),
pointwise estimates for all X and U (within the [0,1] interval) are needed.
To reduce the dimension of the problem, the expectation is modelled as a
partial linear model (see Carneiro, Heckman and Vytlacil, 2003). The con-
stant term and the term depending on X enter the conditional expectation
linearly, whereas K(P (Z)) is modelled nonparametrically. To estimate these
characteristics of the equation, the “double residual regression” of Heckman,
Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998) is used. This slight variation of the par-
tial linear model of Robinson (1988) is tailored for the evaluation of binary
treatment effects. First, equation (15) is rewritten in the following form:
lnY = α0 +Xθ0 +D(α1 − α0) +DX(θ1 − θ0) +DU1 + (1−D)U0
+P (Z)E[U1|P (Z)] + (1− P (Z))E[U0|P (Z)]
−P (Z)E[U1|P (Z)]− (1− P (Z))E[U0|P (Z)]. (18)
The term DU1 + (1−D)U0 − P (Z)E[U1|P (Z)]− (1− P (Z))E[U0|P (Z)] is
gathered in an error term ε, which has mean zero given P (Z) by construc-
tion:
lnY = α0 +Xθ0 +D(α1 − α0) +DX(θ1 − θ0)
+P (Z)E[U1|P (Z)] + (1− P (Z))E[U0|P (Z)] + ε (19)
In parlance of partial linear models, the term P (Z) E[U1|P (Z)] +(1−P (Z))
E[U0|P (Z)] is the nonparametric component. From this, the conditional
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expectation of lnY given P (Z) follows:
E(lnY |P (Z)) = α0 + E(X|P (Z))θ0 + P (Z)(α1 − α0)
+P (Z)E(X|P (Z))(θ1 − θ0) + P (Z)E[U1|P (Z)]
+(1− P (Z))E[U0|P (Z)] (20)
Subtracting (20) from (19) yields:
lnY − E[lnY |P (Z)] = (X − E[X|P (Z)])θ0 + (D − P (Z))×
(α1 − α0) + (DX − P (Z)E[X|P (Z)])(θ1 − θ0) + ε (21)
The conditional expectations E[X|P (Z)] are estimated pointwise by local-
linear regressions. After forming the differences, (21) is estimated by OLS.
Using the estimated residuals from this regression, the derivatives of P (Z)
E[U1|P (Z)] +(1 − P (Z))E[U0|P (Z)] can be estimated by the appropriate
coefficients of local polynomial regressions. Using the empirical distributions
of F (P (Z)|X), the weights for the integration of ∆MTE(x, u) over [0, 1] can
be computed. Using the empirical distribution of X, unconditional treat-
ment effects can be obtained. To judge the significance of the estimated
effects, confidence intervals based on 50 bootstrap samples are computed.
The propensity score is specified as a probit model. The estimated co-
efficients are contained in table 3 in the appendix. All instruments are
significant.
The estimated treatment effects and the bootstrap confidence intervals are
contained in table 1. The point estimates of the treatment effects are neg-
ative. However, the confidence intervals show that the effects are not sta-
tistically significant. Therefore, no statements about the sign of the effect
can be made. The wide confidence intervals show a considerable uncertainty
about the causal effect of training.
The LIV estimates are lower than the relevant OLS estimate, which is 0.03
(t-value: 3.62) and considerably lower than the standard IV estimator, us-
ing the same instruments, which is 0.21 (t-value: 2.37). The latter results
suggest a significant positive effect of training on wages. The insignificant
LIV-estimates cannot support this conclusion. That is, using a method with
considerably weaker assumptions on individual behavior than OLS or linear
IV, the qualitative results of the latter cannot be confirmed. Therefore, the
positive relationship claimed by conventional estimates has to be questioned.
This is in line with the supposition stated in the literature, that estimates
which do not account for (unobserved) heterogeneity and the selection in this
regard are upward biased. We interpret our result that training does not
have an impact on earnings itself but only in combination with unobserved
factors. It is likely that training is part of a promotion path and that not
a certain training, but a career track as a whole leads to earnings growth.
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Table 1: Estimates of the treatment effects
Original Bootstrap samples
sample
Confidence intervals
90% 95%
TUT -.077 (-.123, .015) (-.145, .039)
ATE -.073 (-.119, .015) (-.142, .038)
TT -.063 (-.112, .014) (-.134, .032)
Firms provide training to individuals only when the expected return of this
investment is positive. Hence, training participants might be more able and
motivated and therefore also be on such a track with higher earnings growth.
When this unobserved heterogeneity is taken into account in the selection
into training, the positive training impact estimated by conventional OLS
or IV estimates vanishes.
6 Conclusion
With German survey data from 1998/1999, we examine the heterogeneity
of training returns and whether these may have an effect on training par-
ticipation. Using the local IV method, which allows for the likely fact that
the expected return of the investment in human capital plays a role when
deciding about the investment, we are able to account for heterogeneity of
training returns in earnings equations. The LIV estimator allows for ob-
served as well as unobserved heterogeneity and selection into training may
depend on both. Former work on the wage impact of training has suggested
that selection on unobservables might be important and hence, traditional
estimators used might incorporate an upward bias.
Our LIV estimate is much lower than the relevant OLS and IV estimate (and
furthermore, insignificant). We cannot find any causal effect of training on
wages when taking into account that more able and motivated individu-
als participate in training, or those which are on a promotion path where
training courses are part of the way. For future work it would be useful to
use comprehensive information on career tracks and promotion in order to
distinguish the impact of certain personnel measures.
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A Appendix
A.1 Tables
Table 2: List of Variables Used
Variable Share/Average Notes
Earnings
Less than 600 DM 0.09%
Between 600 and 1000 DM 0.12%
Between 1000 and 1500 DM 0.32%
Between 1500 and 2000 DM 1.20%
Between 2000 and 2500 DM 4.24%
Between 2500 and 3000 DM 7.54%
Between 3000 and 3500 DM 11.98%
Between 3500 and 4000 DM 14.75%
Between 4000 and 4500 DM 14.13%
Between 4500 and 5000 DM 12.19%
Between 5000 and 5500 DM 8.14%
Between 5500 and 6000 DM 7.15%
Between 6000 and 7000 DM 7.15%
Between 7000 and 8000 DM 4.04%
Between 8000 and 9000 DM 2.70%
Between 9000 and 10000 DM 1.51%
Between 10000 and 15000 DM 2.22%
15000 DM and more 0.53%
School Attainment
Without School Leaving Certificate 2.28%
Lower Secondary School 51.33%
Intermediate Secondary School 25.20%
Entrance Examination for 7.93%
University of Applied Sciences
High School Diploma 13.25%
Vocational Training
Without Professional Degree 12.08%
Full-Time Vocational School 2.37% Several years of professional
training in school
Dual Apprenticeship 61.30% Several years of professional
training in school and on-the-job
Master Craftsman 12.64%
University of Applied Sciences 4.92%
University 6.35%
Training
Training 58.08%
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Table 2: List of Variables Used (continued)
Variable Share/Average Notes
Professional Career
Professional Experience 21.87 years Years from first job until today
Company Tenure 12.91 years Years from starting to work for
a company until today
Unemployment 29.85% Dummy = 1 if a person was
ever employed, otherwise 0
Workplace Characteristics
Computer Work Station 49.37% Work routine includes using
the computer
Temporary Work 49.36%
Good Economic Situation 63.25%
Working Hours 177.21 hours Working hours per month
Overtime 79.95% Dummy = 1 if a person works
overtime, otherwise 0
Paid Overtime 35.93%
Overqualified 36.50%
Profit-Sharing 9.20%
Incentive Wage 24.11%
Good Economic Situation 63.25% Dummy = 1 if the company is in
a good economic situation,
otherwise 0
Modern Job 12.06%
Individual Characteristics
Children 48.51% Dummy = 1 if a person has at
least one child, otherwise 0
Foreigner 5.43% Dummy = 1 if a person does
not have a German Nationality,
otherwise 0
Not Married 7.33%
Handicapped 4.85%
Other Variables
Size of Firm 7 Categories
Professional Status 12 Categories
Federal State 11 Categories: all Federal
States of West Germany
Economic Sector 5 Categories
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Table 3: Estimation results for the propensity score
Parameters Estimates Z - Values
Training Intensity 91 1.26 5.29
Bargaining Agreement 1.84 3.03
Modern Job 0.18 3.42
Lower Secondary School 0.29 1.91
Intermediate Secondary School 0.29 1.92
Entrance Examination for 0.30 1.91
University of Applied Sciences
High School Diploma 0.23 1.43
Full-Time Vocational School 0.01 0.07
Dual Apprenticeship 0.19 2.58
Master Craftsman 0.23 2.61
University of Applied Sciences 0.21 2.00
University 0.10 0.90
Professional Experience 0.05 0.72
Company Tenure 0.35 5.02
Unemployment -0.00 -0.11
Computer Work Station 0.36 7.59
Temporary Work -0.24 -2.52
Paid Overtime -0.03 -0.76
Working Hours 0.34 4.34
Overqualified -0.03 -0.69
Profit-Sharing 0.04 0.59
Incentive Wage 0.13 3.04
Good Economic Situation -0.02 -0.43
Children 0.08 2.00
Not Married 0.01 0.12
Handicapped 0.01 0.10
Constant -3.37 -11.52
Number of Observations 7417
LR-Test (χ2(72)) 1987.10
P-value of LR-Test 0.00
Dummy variables are included for size of firm, professional status, federal state, and economic sector.
Instruments included are: technical restructuring, organizational restructuring, three measures
of personnel restructuring (hiring of additional workers, downsizing, and hiring of temporary workers),
a dummy variable indicating whether workers are employed in a modern job, and sectoral shares of firms
by employment size that include continuous training in their collective bargaining agreement.
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A.2 Figures
Figure 1: Training Participation per Age Groups
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Figure 2: Training Participation per Qualification Groups
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